The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that an Ohio court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who allegedly defamed an Ohio corporation via the Internet even though the nonresident had never set foot in Ohio. See Kauffman Racing Equip., LLC v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2010). The defendant, a resident of Virginia, had purchased an engine block from the plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, made his purchase over the Internet, and never was in Ohio. Claiming a defect, the defendant sent the engine block to the plaintiff for inspection, which returned it to him unrepaired, claiming post-sale modifications had been made to it. The disgruntled defendant turned to online message boards, writing that the plaintiff “is less than honorable,” and his postings were “not to get a resolution” but that he had “a much bigger and dastardly plan.” Id. at ¶¶13, 15. In support of jurisdiction, the plaintiff offered evidence that it had received at least five inquiries from Ohio residents as a result of the defendant’s online postings.
In deciding the case, the Ohio Supreme Court employed the familiar test of determining (1) whether the state’s long-arm statute and civil rules conferred jurisdiction, and, if so, (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction would deprive the defendant of his right to due process. As to the first prong of the test, the court held that the allegedly defamatory comments were considered “published” in Ohio because they were viewed by Ohio residents, which meant that the “alleged tort was committed in Ohio,” thus satisfying the long-arm statute and civil rules. Id. at ¶42 (citing O.R.C. 2307.382(A)(3); Ohio R. Civ. P. 4.3(A)(3)). Moreover, the first prong is satisfied “[w]hen defamatory statements regarding an Ohio plaintiff are made outside the state yet with the purpose of causing injury to the Ohio resident and there is a reasonable expectation that the purposefully inflicted injury will occur in Ohio.” Id. at ¶44.
As to the second prong – due process – the court relied most heavily upon the decision of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), in which the due process rights of the National Inquirer, a Florida resident, were found not to have been unconstitutionally impinged by California’s exercise of jurisdiction over it after it allegedly had libeled “the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California.” Id. at ¶52. Jurisdiction was proper because “California [was] the focal point of both the story and the harm suffered.” Id. Analogizing to Calder, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that in Roberts“the allegedly defamatory statements were communicated to Ohio residents,” and the plaintiff is “an Ohio-based company whose reputation is centered in Ohio and that had engaged in commercial activity with [the defendant] before the controversy.” Id. at ¶65 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of being haled into an Ohio court because he “not only knew that [the] Ohio resident . . . could be the victim [of his postings], he intended it be the victim.” Id. at ¶68. Finally, the defendant had contacts in Ohio through the purchase of the engine block, and Ohio has an interest in the plaintiff obtaining relief. Id. at ¶¶70-72.
The court concluded that it would “decline to allow a nonresident defendant to take advantage of the conveniences that modern technology affords and simultaneously be shielded from the consequences of his intentionally tortious conduct.” Id. at ¶74. The decision was reached four-to-two with one abstention. The dissent wrote that due process rights are violated by providing “an avenue for any affected Ohioan to sue the originator of any negative post in an Ohio court when the product has been purchased in Ohio and the negative post is read by an Ohio resident,” and that the effect would be to “chill the exercise of free speech.” Id. at ¶¶80-81. Will this decision have lasting ramifications for future cases? Why or why not?
