Connick v. Thompson, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2594 (U.S. March 29, 2011).
Introduction.
In Connick v. Thompson, the Supreme Court tightened the liability standards for §1983 claims involving the alleged failure to train governmental employees. The plaintiff in Connick spent 18 years in prison, including 14 years on death row before his convictions were vacated because exculpatory evidence had been withheld by prosecutors at his original criminal trial. The Court in Connick reversed a $14 million verdict against the District Attorney’s Office that had prosecuted the plaintiff.
The plaintiff in Connick was initially tried and convicted of attempted armed robbery. The prosecutors in that case failed to disclose the existence of exculpatory scientific evidence. Because of that conviction, the plaintiff did not testify in his own defense in a subsequent murder trial and was again convicted. One month before his scheduled execution, an investigator discovered the undisclosed evidence from his armed robbery trial. A reviewing court determined that because the evidence was exculpatory, both of his convictions should be vacated. Plaintiff then sued the New Orleans Parish District Attorney for his alleged failure to train prosecutors about their obligation to produce exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
To place the Connick decision in its proper context, two points bear mentioning. First, absolute immunity is generally available to prosecutors for conduct that “is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 413-16 (1976), but that defense is not available to a governmental entity such as a district attorney’s office. Second, vicarious liability is not permitted under §1983. A governmental entity cannot be held liable for its employee’s constitutional violations that occur in the course and scope of employment. Rather, governmental entities can only be held liable for their own illegal acts, which requires “action pursuant to an official municipal policy.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Official municipal policy “includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2594 at * 17-18.
Connick’s Analysis of the Failure to Train Issue.
The Supreme Court explained that governmental liability under §1983 “is at its most tenuous [point] where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick, 2011 U.S. LEXIS at *18. Training claims are “far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the constitutional violation” than the typical §1983 policy claim addressed under Monell. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985). Thus, §1983 liability can be triggered only when the alleged policy of failing to properly train employees amounts to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of those who come in contact with the inadequately trained employees. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 373, 388 (1989).
Deliberate indifference requires proof that a governmental official “disregarded a known or obvious consequence” of his or her action or decision. Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). Deliberate indifference in this context can be established when governmental policymakers are on notice of an omission in their training program is allegedly causing constitutional violations and do nothing. That “policy of inaction” is deemed to be “the functional equivalent of a decision by the [governmental entity] itself to violate the Constitution.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 395.
The Supreme Court in Canton recognized that §1983 training liability can arise in two potential scenarios. The first is where a series of constitutional violations makes the need for training obvious. 489 U.S. at 395. A pattern of constitutional violations is typically necessary to demonstrate that a governmental entity was “deliberately indifferent” to the constitutional rights of its citizens. Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 409. However, the Supreme Court in Canton also hypothesized that §1983 training liability could arise in the absence of a pattern of violations when the need for training on a particular issue was obvious at the outset. The Court suggested a police officer’s use of deadly force was an example where training should be provided at the outset even in the absence of a pattern of constitutional violations. Canton, 489 U.S. at 390, n. 10.
The plaintiff in Connick proceeded under that latter theory and the Court summarily rejected his claim. 2011 LEXIS at *22. The Court in Connick observed that plaintiff’s claim did not fall “within the narrow range of . . . hypothesized single-incident liability” scenarios where the need for training at the outset was obvious. Id. at *23. The Court noted that armed police must make split-second decisions with life or death consequences, whereas prosecutors receive training in law school, have ongoing mandatory continuing legal education requirements and ethical duties with which they must comply. Id. at *23-28. In the Court’s view, this legal training “is what differentiated attorneys from average public employees.” Id. at *24.
In the ten years preceding plaintiff’s prosecution, four other convictions had been set aside due to the failure by prosecutors in the District Attorney’s Office to produce exculpatory evidence. In the Court’s view, this did not establish a pattern of violations sufficient to put the District Attorney on notice of the need for additional training. None of those prior instances involved the failure to produce scientific evidence and none involved a failure similar to what occurred in plaintiff’s case. Connick, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2594 at *20-21.
Connick further explained that failure-to-train liability cannot be based upon “contemporaneous or subsequent” conduct. Id. at *21, n.7. The Court also observed that failure-to-train liability is concerned with the substance of the training, not its particular format, and rejected the notion that liability could be based on the theory that more or better training would have prevented the type of conduct in question from occurring. Id. at *30. The Supreme Court in Connick concluded that failure-to-train liability does not provide courts with carte blanche to micro-manage local units of government or their training programs. Id.
Impact of the Decision
The Supreme Court’s decision in Connick limits the circumstances in which failure-to-train liability can be imposed under §1983. In most instances, a plaintiff will have to demonstrate a pattern of prior constitutional violations of a similar nature before liability can attach under this theory. This should make pleading §1983 training claims more difficult because the Supreme Court requires complaints to assert enough facts to demonstrate a plausible entitlement to relief. When a complaint fails to factually assert a pattern of similar constitutional violations, a motion to dismiss should be considered. Moreover, liability cannot be premised upon assertions that specialized training, or more or better training should have been provided. Thus, Connick may help to weed out §1983 training claims at an early stage of the proceedings.
While Connick will obviously be helpful in defending §1983 training claims, the decision’s impact may be limited by the Court’s acknowledgment that the legal training which prosecutors receive distinguishes them from other public employees. Nonetheless, in most instances, there can be no §1983 training liability following Connick, absent a pattern of prior constitutional violations of a similar nature.
About the Author: Steven Puiszis is a partner in the Chicago office of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, and is a member of DRI’s Board of Directors. He also is the Author of ILLINOIS GOVERNMENTAL TORT AND SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY, (Matthew Bender (Lexis/Nexis), 3d ed. 2009).
